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Abstract  The  standard  analysis  of  the  impact  of  EPL  on  labour  market  outcomes  concentrates
mainly on  unemployment  and  job  ﬂows,  disregarding  possible  effects  on  labour  productivity.
In this  paper  we  make  (a  component  of)  labour  productivity  endogenous  and  analyze  how  the
presence  of  a  stringent  protection  legislation  affects  labour  market  in  an  equilibrium  matching
model with  endogenous  job  destruction.  In  particular,  in  our  study  we  imagine  that  an  employed
worker has  to  exert  effort  to  produce  and  this  generates  disutility.  Therefore,  in  this  framework
high labour  productivity  on  one  hand  is  costly  for  a  worker  in  terms  of  disutility,  and  on  the
other hand  might  be  beneﬁcial  in  terms  of  lower  job  destruction.  We  ﬁnd  that  high  ﬁring  costs
partially substitute  high  labour  productivity  in  reducing  job  destruction  and  this,  consequently,
brings down  the  optimal  level  of  productivity.  Furthermore,  the  impact  of  EPL  on  unemployment
is ambiguous  but  numerical  exercises  show  unambiguously  how  higher  ﬁring  restrictions  reduce
different  measures  of  aggregate  welfare.  To  some  extent,  the  clear  emergence  of  these  results
leads to  interesting  policy  implications  and,  indeed,  rationalizes  the  recent  empirical  evidence
on the  impact  of  EPL.
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Impacto  de  la  legislación  de  protección  del  empleo  sobre  la  productividad  laboral
en  un  modelo  combinado  de  equilibrio  general
Resumen  El  análisis  estándar  del  impacto  de  la  EPL  sobre  los  resultados  en  el  mercado  laboral
se concentra  sobre  todo  en  el  paro  y  en  los  ﬂujos  de  trabajo  y  paro.  En  este  documentoPALABRAS  CLAVE
Protección
hacemos endógena  (un  componente  de)  la  productividad  laboral  y  analizamos  cómo  afecta  al
mercado laboral  la  presencia  de  una  legislación  de  protección  rigurosa  en  un  modelo  combinado
de equilibrio  apropiado  con  la  destrucción  de  empleo  endógena.  Concretamente,  en  nuestro
 trabajador  por  cuenta  ajena  debe  hacer  esfuerzos  para  producirdel  empleo; estudio imaginamos  que  un
Productividad  laboral
endógena;
y esto  genera  desutilidad.  Por  lo  tanto,  dentro  de  este  marco,  para  un  trabajador  la  alta
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Destrucción
de  empleo
productividad  laboral  es  costosa  en  términos  de  desutilidad,  pero  también  puede  ser  beneﬁciosa
por lo  que  se  reﬁere  a  la  menor  destrucción  de  empleo.  Observamos  que  el  alto  coste  del  despido
sustituye parcialmente  la  alta  productividad  laboral  al  reducir  la  destrucción  de  empleo  y,  en
consecuencia,  esto  reduce  el  nivel  óptimo  de  productividad.  Además,  el  impacto  de  la  EPL
sobre el  desempleo  es  ambiguo,  pero  los  cálculos  numéricos  muestran  de  manera  evidente
cómo las  mayores  restricciones  del  despido  reducen  diferentes  medidas  de  bienestar  global.
En cierta  medida,  la  aparición  evidente  de  estos  resultados  conlleva  implicaciones  normativas
interesantes  y,  lo  que  es  más,  racionaliza  la  evidencia  empírica  reciente  sobre  el  impacto  de  la
EPL.
© 2012  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  dere-
chos reservados.
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L1. Introduction
Recent  empirical  evidence  from  European  countries  and
the  US  shows  that  the  presence  of  stringent  employ-
ment  protection  legislation  (EPL)  affects  signiﬁcantly  labour
productivity.  In  particular,  cross-country  (DeFreitas  and
Marshall,  1998),  diff-in-diff  (Micco  and  Pages,  2006;  Autor
et  al.,  2006,  2007;  Bassanini  and  Venn,  2007;  Bassanini  et  al.,
2009;  Lisi,  2013)  and  other  studies  (Riphahn,  2004;  Ichino
and  Riphahn,  2005)  found  that  higher  EPL  have  a  negative
impact  on  labour  productivity.
Nonetheless,  standard  theoretical  analysis  of  EPL  focuses
mainly  on  unemployment  and  job  ﬂows,  disregarding  pos-
sible  effects  on  labour  productivity.  In  particular,  both
standard  analysis  of  labour  demand  under  uncertainty
(Bentolila  and  Bertola,  1990;  Bertola,  1990;  Bentolila  and
Saint-Paul,  1992;  Bentolila  and  Dolado,  1994;  Boeri  and
Garibaldi,  2007)  and  general  equilibrium  models  (Mortensen
and  Pissarides,  1994,  1999b;  Garibaldi,  1998;  Pissarides,
2000;  Cahuc  and  Postel-Vinay,  2002)  tend  to  consider  an
exogenous  productivity,  not  inﬂuenced  by  the  presence
of  labour-market  policies.  Indeed,  some  studies  analyze
the  role  of  EPL  in  distorting  the  adjustment  of  employ-
ment  and  investment,  consequently  affecting  productivity
(Hopenhayn  and  Rogerson,  1993;  Saint-Paul,  1997,  2002;
Bartelsman  and  Hinloopen,  2005).
In  this  paper,  in  the  spirit  of  Ichino  and  Riphahn  (2005),
we  concentrate  more  on  the  behavioural  component  of
productivity.  Therefore,  we  make  (a  component  of)  labour
productivity  an  endogenous  object  of  the  model  and,  then,
study  the  impact  of  a  stringent  protection  legislation.  Since
our  concern  is  to  understand  the  equilibrium  impact  on  pro-
ductivity,  unemployment  and  welfare,  we  need  to  embed
the  analysis  into  an  equilibrium  model  of  the  labour  mar-
ket.  To  this  extent,  the  matching  approach  to  equilibrium
unemployment  should  represent  the  best  candidate  for  this
kind  of  analysis.
In  the  canonical  matching  model  total  productivity  is  usu-
ally  characterized  by  an  exogenous  common  component,
affecting  productivity  in  all  jobs,  and  an  idiosyncratic  com-
ponent,  governed  by  a  stochastic  process.  Indeed,  in  such
speciﬁcation  of  productivity  there  do  not  seem  to  be  place
for  workers.  Differently,  in  our  study  we  imagine  that  an
employed  worker  has  to  exert  effort  to  produce  and  this
generates  disutility.  Following  this  argument,  we  assume
t
e
a
That  a  component  of  productivity  is  determined  by  the  level
f  effort  exerted  by  workers.  Thus,  in  this  framework  high
abour  productivity  on  one  hand  is  costly  for  a  worker  in
erms  of  disutility,  and  on  the  other  hand  might  be  beneﬁcial
n  terms  of  lower  job  destruction.  Since  stringent  protec-
ion  legislation  has  the  same  well-known  effect  of  reducing
ob  destruction  (e.g.  Pissarides,  2000),  EPL  might  affect
otal  productivity  also  through  this  behavioural  component.
herefore,  the  novelty  introduced  in  this  paper  should  con-
ribute  to  offer  a more  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the
mpact  of  EPL  on  labour  productivity  and,  more  generally,
n  labour-market  outcomes.
An  equilibrium  is  a  job  destruction  and  job  creation  rule,
 labour  productivity  and  a  level  of  unemployment  implied
y  the  rational  expectations  behaviour  of  individual  ﬁrms
nd  workers  and  by  the  matching  technology.  We  study  how
he  presence  of  a  stringent  protection  legislation  affects
roductivity,  unemployment  and  welfare  in  the  aggregate
teady-state.  We  ﬁnd  that  high  ﬁring  costs  partially  substi-
ute  high  labour  productivity  in  reducing  job  destruction  and
his,  consequently,  brings  down  the  equilibrium  labour  pro-
uctivity.  Furthermore,  the  impact  of  EPL  on  unemployment
s  ambiguous  but  numerical  exercises  show  unambiguously
ow  higher  ﬁring  restrictions  reduce  different  measures  of
ggregate  welfare.  To  some  extent,  the  clear  emergence  of
hese  results  leads  to  interesting  policy  implications,  espe-
ially  in  the  light  of  the  great  debate  emerged  in  the  last
ears  regarding  EPL.  Moreover,  the  extension  pursued  in  this
aper  would  offer  a  reasonable  interpretation  to  rationalize
he  recent  evidence  on  the  negative  impact  of  EPL  on  pro-
uctivity.  Indeed,  this  approach  to  consider  labour  market
utcomes  and  personnel  economics  together  in  addressing
olicy  questions  has  already  turned  out  to  be  successful  (see
.g.  Shapiro  and  Stiglitz,  1984).
In  regards  to  how  this  paper  places  in  that  strand
f  literature  aiming  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  EPL,  the
ain  contribution  consists  in  introducing  labour  productiv-
ty  (besides  unemployment  and  job  ﬂows)  in  the  general
quilibrium  evaluation  of  this  particular  policy  in  the  labour
arket.  To  this  extent,  the  paper  shares  the  same  spirit  of
agos  (2006). In  particular,  that  paper  proposes  an  aggrega-
ive  model  of  TFP  in  the  matching  framework,  allowing  to
valuate  the  impact  of  labour-market  policies  on  the  general
ggregate  production  function  and,  especially,  on  average
FP.  Nonetheless,  in  Lagos  (2006)  higher  ﬁring  costs  affect
1T
n
d
w
b
s
n
(
e
o
I
w
e
i
a
m
l
i
t
a
l
l
l
i
t
w
3
t
e
e
f
F
2
T
e
(
n
c
n
p
e
t
c
b
i
o
c
T
e
j
e
r
a
w
w
c
h
n
d
p
a
w
p
o
o
p
c
a
u
m
p
u
N
h
w
t
s
n
d
b
l
ﬁ
e
p
r
e
c
s
p
e
p
W
t
s
g
i
p
b
F
a
f30  
FP  only  by  reducing  ﬁrms’  job  destruction  in  response  to
egative  shocks,  implying  a  lower  average  idiosyncratic  pro-
uctivity  of  active  units.  Indeed,  in  the  model  proposed  here
e  will  see  that  a  more  comprehensive  evaluation  of  EPL,
eyond  the  impact  on  the  average  idiosyncratic  component,
hould  consider  also  the  impact  on  the  behavioural  compo-
ent  of  productivity.
On  the  other  hand,  this  paper  is  also  close  to  Dolado  et  al.
2011),  aiming  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  having  large  differ-
nces  between  EPL  for  permanent  and  temporary  contracts
n  endogenous  workers’  effort  and  ﬁrms’  conversion  rates.
nterestingly,  they  ﬁnd  that  an  increase  in  ﬁring  costs  gap
ould  lead  to  a  reduction  in  both  ﬁrms’  conversion  rate  and
ffort  exerted  by  temporary  workers.  Nonetheless,  as  stated
n  their  paper,  they  focus  on  temporary  contracts  insomuch
s  they  still  consider  productivity  for  permanent  employ-
ent  exogenous  and,  in  turn,  not  inﬂuenced  by  protection
egislation.  Moreover,  in  order  to  stress  the  mechanism  link-
ng  ﬁring  costs  to  conversion  rates  and  temporary  workers,
hey  work  in  a  partial  equilibrium  framework  under  different
ssumptions.1 Differently,  in  this  paper  we  aim  to  under-
ine  the  key  mechanism  whereby  EPL  could  affect  average
abour  productivity  of  regular  workers  in  a  general  equi-
ibrium  framework,  that  is,  not  only  by  reducing  average
diosyncratic  productivity  of  active  units,  but  also  by  substi-
uting  high  labour  productivity  in  containing  job  destruction.
The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows:  in  Section  2
e  describe  the  basic  theoretical  framework  and  in  Section
 characterize  its  steady-state.  Section  4  studies  qualita-
ively  the  impact  of  a  stringent  protection  legislation  on  the
quilibrium  level.  In  Section  5  we  conduct  some  numerical
xercise  to  study  the  effect  on  productivity,  but  also  on  dif-
erent  measure  of  aggregate  welfare.  Section  6  concludes.
inally,  Appendix  A  contains  some  useful  derivations.
. The theoretical framework
he  basic  theoretical  framework  is  the  matching  approach  to
quilibrium  unemployment  with  endogenous  job  destruction
e.g.  Pissarides,  2000).  In  this  economy  there  is  an  endoge-
ously  sized  continuum  of  jobs,  characterized  by  a  common
omponent  of  productivity  p  and  an  idiosyncratic  compo-
ent  x.  Each  product  commands  in  the  market  a  price  of
x,  which  evidently  differs  from  each  other  for  the  pres-
nce  of  the  idiosyncratic  component.  In  standard  versions  of
his  model  p  is  usually  considered  an  exogenous  parameter,
apturing  macro  events  that  affect  productivity  in  all  jobs
y  the  same  amount  and  in  the  same  direction.  Differently,
n  this  paper  we  interpret  p  as  the  behavioural  component
f  labour  productivity,  with  x  still  representing  the  idiosyn-
ratic  condition  in  the  market,  due  to  demand  or  technology.
herefore,  in  our  model  we  do  not  consider  p  a  parameter
1 In particular, Dolado et al. (2011) work in a partial equilibrium
nvironment with certainty, implying exogenous vacancy ﬁlling and
ob destruction rates. Moreover, they assume a linear disutility of
ffort (whereas here we work with an increasing disutility), which
epresents the unique component of productivity (that is, without
ny stochastic idiosyncratic component). Therefore, in their frame-
ork neither job destruction nor labour productivity of regular
orkers is affected by EPL.
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apturing  macro  shocks,  because  our  aim  is  indeed  to  study
ow  ﬁring  costs  affect  the  level  of  the  behavioural  compo-
ent  of  productivity.  However,  it  is  evident  that  there  is  no
ifﬁculty  in  including  also  such  parameter  in  our  model.
The  stochastic  process  governing  the  idiosyncratic  com-
onent  x  is  Poisson  with  arrival  rate  .  Whenever  a  jump
rrives,  the  new  level  of  x  is  drawn  from  the  distribution  G(x)
ith  ﬁnite  upper  support x¯ and no  mass  point.  The  Poisson
rocess  implies  that  shocks  are  persistent,  but  conditional
n  change  the  new  draws  are  independent  by  the  initial  level
f  x.
Each  ﬁrm  has  only  one  job  that  can  be  either  ﬁlled  and
roducing  some  good  (state  J(x)),  according  to  the  idiosyn-
ratic  level  x and  the  behavioural  productivity  p,  or  vacant
nd  searching  for  a  worker  (state  V),  which  costs  pc  per
nit  of  time.  Firms  have  full  information  on  technology  and
arket  condition,  therefore  they  create  always  the  most
roﬁtable  job,  that  is,  with  the  idiosyncratic  level  at  the
pper  support  of  the  price  distribution.  Furthermore,  the
ash  bargaining  rule  implies  also  that  new  jobs  offer  the
ighest  wage.  However,  investments  are  irreversible  and
hen  a  shock  arrives  ﬁrms  have  no  choice  over  their  produc-
ivity.  Filled  jobs  not  always  resist  to  negative  productivity
hocks  and,  in  particular,  they  are  destroyed  whenever  the
ew  draw  of  x  falls  below  a  certain  level  of  reservation  pro-
uctivity  R.  This  implies  that  each  job  has  a  probability  of
eing  destroyed  equal  to  G(R).  Job  destruction  is  not  cost-
ess,  rather  whenever  a  job  is  destroyed  ﬁrm  has  to  pay  the
ring  costs  pF.
Respectively,  each  worker  can  be  in  one  of  two  states,
mployed  and  producing  some  good  (state  W(x))  or  unem-
loyed  and  searching  for  a  job  (state  U).  Employed  worker
eceives  the  wage  w(x)  and  has  to  choose  how  much  effort
 to  exert  in  the  job,  which  determines  the  common
omponent  of  productivity  p =  f(e).  Even  if  not  neces-
ary,  we  assume  a  linear  relation  p  =  e between  effort  and
roductivity.2 On  the  contrary,  unemployed  worker  does  not
xert  effort  and  beneﬁts  only  from  z,  which  can  be  inter-
reted  either  as  unemployment  compensation  or  as  leisure.
ages  are  the  outcome  of  the  Nash  bargaining,  according
o  which  workers  receive  a  fraction  0  <  ˇ <  1  of  the  match
urplus,  where  ˇ  can  be  interpreted  as  the  workers’  bar-
aining  power.  Since  the  match  surplus  is  conditional  on
diosyncratic  productivity,  wages  are  revised  whenever  a
roductivity  shock  occurs.  In  particular,  it  is  intuitive  that
oth  match  surplus  and  wage  are  increasing  function  of  x.
ollowing  the  previous  literature,  we  assume  that  workers
re  risk  neutral  and  impatient,  which  implies  zero  saving  and
ull  consumption.  Furthermore,  exerting  effort  generates  an
ncreasing  disutility.  Therefore,  an  employed  worker  enjoys
onditional  on  x  the  instantaneous  utility(x)  =  w(x)  − 1
2
e2,
2 Notice that this speciﬁcation is without loss of generality, given
hat for the utility function below an additional parameter on the
elation p = ϕe would not be identiﬁed, but only /ϕ2 would be
dentiﬁed.
h
s
a
c
t
r
r
I
c
v
e
W
a
e
a
b
W
t
t
c
o
u
o
d
a
o
a
l
a
S
a
W
a
e
o
w
ﬁ
q
S(x)  =  J(x)  −  (V  −  pF)  +  W(x)  −  UThe  impact  of  EPL  on  labour  productivity  
where    is  the  parameter  governing  marginal  disutility  of
effort  (see  e.g.  Garibaldi,  2006),  whereas  the  instantaneous
utility  of  the  unemployed  worker  is  simply
u  =  z.
The  number  of  matches  between  vacant  jobs  and  unem-
ployed  workers  is  governed  by  a  canonical  matching  function
m(v,  u),  where  v  and  u  are  respectively  the  number  of  vacant
jobs  and  unemployed  workers.  Labour  force  is  normalized
to  1,  so  that  in  this  economy  the  number  of  unemployed
workers  u  is  the  unemployment  rate.  As  standard  in  the
literature,  we  assume  that  the  matching  function  is  twice
continuously  differentiable,  increasing  and  concave  in  both
its  arguments  and  homogeneous  of  degree  one,  with  elas-
ticity  strictly  between  0  <    <  1.  By  linear  homogeneity,  the
transition  rate  from  vacant  to  ﬁlled  job  is  m(v,  u)/v  =  m(1,
u/v)  =  q(),  with  q′()  <  0,  where    = v/u  identiﬁes  the  labour
market  tightness.  Moreover,  the  elasticity  of  q()  is  strictly
between  −1  <    <  0  and  it  is  related  with  the  elasticity  of  the
matching  function  (respect  to  v)  by    =    −  1.  Similarly,  the
transition  probability  from  unemployed  to  employed  is  m(v,
u)/u  =  m(v/u,  1)  =  q(),  an  increasing  function  of  .
Thus,  the  endogenous  variables  of  the  model  are  the  level
of  market  tightness  ,  the  level  of  reservation  productivity
R,  the  level  of  effort  e  and,  in  turn,  labour  productivity  p
and  the  level  of  unemployment  u.  In  the  next  section  we
characterize  and  derive  their  steady-state  values.
3. Steady-state equilibrium
In  steady-state  the  choice  of  opening  a  vacancy  and  destroy-
ing  a  job  for  a  ﬁrm,  as  well  as  the  level  of  effort  for  a  worker,
are  based  on  their  asset  values.  Indeed,  these  values  are
fairly  similar  to  those  in  a  canonical  matching  model  (e.g.
Pissarides,  2000),  with  the  difference  of  the  effort  level  in
the  worker  utility  function.  Therefore,  the  inclusion  of  effort
does  not  change  heavily  the  asset  values,  but  it  does  change
signiﬁcantly  the  subsequent  steady-state  analysis.
From  the  assumptions  on  vacancy  cost,  idiosyncratic
component  and  ﬁring  costs,  we  have  that  the  asset  values
of  a  vacancy  and  a  ﬁlled  job  satisfy  the  following  Bellman
equations:
rV  =  −pc  +  q()[J(x¯)  −  V]  (1)
rJ(x)  =  px  −  w(x)  +  
∫ x¯
R
J(s)dG(s)  −  G(R)pF  −  J(x)  (2)
In  (1)  a  ﬁrm  has  to  pay  the  vacancy  cost  per  unit  of  time
--  pc  and  with  probability  q()  matches  with  an  unemployed
worker,  gives  up  the  value  of  a  vacancy  V  and  gets  the  value
of  a  ﬁlled  job  at  the  upper  support  of  the  price  distribution
J(x¯).  In  steady-state  vacancies  are  opened  until  all  rents  are
exhausted.  Therefore,  the  equilibrium  zero-proﬁt  condition
is
rV  =  0  ⇒  J(x¯)  = pc
q()
(3)In  (2),  conditional  on  the  idiosyncratic  productivity,  a  ﬁrm
enjoys  the  value  of  product  px  and  pay  the  wage  w(x),  then
with  probability    a  shock  arrives  and  a  new  level  of  x  is
drawn  from  the  price  distribution  G(x).  In  this  case  the  ﬁrm
c
w
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as  to  give  up  the  value  J(x)  and  gets  the  new  value  J(s)  if
 is  over  the  reservation  productivity  R,  or  destroys  the  job
nd  pay  ﬁring  costs  pF  in  case  the  new  draw  s  is  under  R.
Similarly,  from  the  assumptions  on  unemployment
ompensation  (or  leisure)  and  instantaneous  utility  function,
he  asset  values  of  unemployed  and  employed  worker  satisfy
U  =  z  +  q()[W(x¯)  −  U] (4)
W(x)  =  w(x)  − 1
2
e2 +  
∫ x¯
R
W(s)dG(s)  +  G(R)U  −  W(x)
(5)
n  (4)  an  unemployed  worker  enjoys  the  unemployment
ompensation  z  and  with  probability  q()  matches  with  a
acant  job,  gives  up  the  value  U  and  gets  the  value  of  being
mployed  at  the  upper  support  of  the  price  distribution
(x¯).  In  (5), conditional  on  the  idiosyncratic  productivity,
n  employed  worker  enjoys  the  wage  w(x)  but  suffers  the
ffort  exerted  −(1/2)e2, then  with  probability    a  shock
rrives  and  a  new  level  of  x  is  drawn  from  the  price  distri-
ution  G(x).  In  this  case  the  worker  has  to  give  up  the  value
(x)  and  gets  the  new  value  W(s)  if  s is  over  the  reserva-
ion  productivity  R,  or  the  value  of  unemployed  U  in  case
he  new  draw  s  is  under  R.  Furthermore,  as  will  be  more
lear  below,  e  is  the  effort  level  maximizing  the  asset  value
f  being  employed,  since  we  characterize  the  equilibrium
nder  rational  expectations.
Nash  bargaining  implies  that  workers  receive  a  fraction  ˇ
f  the  total  match  surplus,  which  is  revised  whenever  a  pro-
uctivity  shock  occurs.  However,  the  total  match  surplus  of
 new  job  is  different  from  that  of  an  existing  job,  because
nly  in  an  existing  job  ﬁrms  save  ﬁring  costs  for  the  continu-
tion  of  the  match.  Therefore,  as  standard  in  the  matching
iterature,  we  have  to  distinguish  between  the  outside  w0
nd  the  inside  wage  w(x).
In  the  case  of  a  new  job  the  match  surplus  is
0(x¯)  =  J(x¯)  −  V  +  W(x¯)  −  U
nd  the  sharing  rule  implies
(x¯)  −  U  =  ˇ(J(x¯)  −  V  +  W(x¯)  −  U)  (6)
Using  the  relation  p  =  e,  the  zero-proﬁt  condition  (3),  the
sset  equations  for  a  ﬁlled  job  (2),  unemployed  (4)  and
mployed  worker  (5)  and  the  sharing  rule  (6), gives  the
utside  wage  equation3
0 =  (1  −  ˇ)
(
z  + 1
2
p2
)
+  pˇ(x¯ +  c  −  F)  (7)
Differently,  in  the  case  of  an  existing  job  a  ﬁrm  saves
ring  costs  for  the  continuation  of  the  match  and,  conse-
uently,  the  match  surplus  changes  in  the  following3 The derivation of the inside and outside wage equations
an be found in the working paper version (Lisi, 2010),
hich can be downloaded from http://www.demq.unict.it/
b/Allegati/wp 2010 08 c1 merged.pdf.
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and  the  sharing  rule  implies
(x)  −  U  =  ˇ[J(x)  −  (V  −  pF)  +  W(x)  −  U]
Following  the  same  argument,  we  get  the  inside  wage
quation
(x)  =  (1  −  ˇ)
(
z  + 1
2
p2
)
+  pˇ(x  +  c  +  rF) (8)
qs.  (7)  and  (8)  differ  only  for  the  impact  of  ﬁring  costs  F
nd,  indeed,  this  difference  emphasizes  the  standard  con-
ict  between  insiders  and  outsiders.  On  one  hand,  inside
 match  the  prospect  of  paying  F  leads  ﬁrms  to  concede
arginally  a  higher  wage  to  avoid  the  destruction  of  exist-
ng  jobs.  On  the  other  hand,  outside  a  match  the  expectation
f  paying  ﬁring  costs,  when  the  job  will  be  destroyed,  leads
rms  to  start  the  new  match  with  a  lower  wage  to  partially
ecoup  the  future  payment  of  F.  Moreover,  as  (7)  clearly
hows  the  impact  of  F  on  the  outside  wage  is  higher  when    is
igher,  because  the  probability  of  job  destruction  is  greater.
The  choice  of  destroying  a  job  is  taken  inside  a  match,
herefore  we  use  the  inside  wage  equation  to  derive  the  job
estruction  condition.  Substituting  (8)  in  (2),  we  get  a  more
xplicit  expression  of  the  asset  value  of  a  ﬁlled  job  J(x)  as
 function  of  the  idiosyncratic  component
r  +  )J(x)  =  (1  −  ˇ)
(
px  −  z  − 1
2
p2
)
−  pˇ(c  +  rF)  +    ×
∫ x¯
R
J(s)dG(s)  −  G(R)pF  (9)
rom  (9)  we  can  see  that  J(x)  is  a  monotonically  increas-
ng  function  of  x.  This  implies  that  there  exists  a  unique
alue  x*  such  that  J(x*)  =  0  and,  in  turn,  for  any  x  greater
smaller)  than  x*,  then  J(x)  >  0  (J(x)  <  0).  In  the  model  with-
ut  ﬁring  costs,  this  implies  that  the  reservation  productivity
,  under  which  a  ﬁrm  destroys  a  job,  satisﬁes  the  reserva-
ion  property  J(R)  =  0.  Differently,  with  ﬁring  costs  for  a  ﬁrm
s  optimal  to  continue  even  a  negative  match,  as  far  as  the
egative  surplus  is  smaller  than  the  cost  of  destroying  a job
F.  Therefore,  with  ﬁring  costs  the  reservation  property  is
(R)  =  −pF  (or  W(R)  =  U),  which  allows  us  to  characterize  the
eservation  productivity  R.
Evaluating  the  generic  asset  equation  of  a  ﬁlled  job  J(x)
t  x  =  R,  we  have  the  following
r  +  )J(R)  =  (1  −  ˇ)
(
pR  −  z  − 1
2
p2
)
−  pˇ(c  +  rF)  +  
∫ x¯
R
J(s)dG(s)  −  G(R)pF  (10)
Now,  subtracting  equation  J(R)  from  the  generic  asset
quation  (9)  and,  then,  using  the  reservation  property
(R)  =  −pF,  we  get
(r  +  )[J(x)  −  J(R)]  =  (1  −  ˇ)p(x  −  R)
(11)
J(x)  = (1  −  ˇ)p(x  −  R)
r  +   −  pF
Finally,  substituting  (11)  in  the  integral  expression  of  (10)
nd  dividing  by  (1  −  ˇ)p,  we  get  an  implicit  expression  for
A
i
o
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 as  a  function  of  market  tightness  ,  labour  productivity  p
nd  the  parameters  of  the  model
 − z
p
− 1
2
p  − ˇ
1  −  ˇc  +

r +  
∫ x¯
R
(x  −  R)dG(s)  +  rF  =  0
(12)
q.  (12)  is  the  ﬁrst  steady-state  condition  of  the  model.  In
hat  follow  we  will  refer  to  this  as  the  job  destruction  rule
JD),  when  we  emphasize  the  relation  between  R  and  ,  or
s  the  reservation  equation  (RE),  when  we  emphasize  the
elation  between  R  and  p.
The  value  of  pR  is  the  lowest  acceptable  price  to  con-
inue  a  job.  Moreover,  from  (12)  we  can  see  that  pR  is  lower
han  the  reservation  wage  (rU  =  z  +  (ˇ/1  −  ˇ)pc),  which
s  the  lowest  acceptable  wage  for  a  worker.  One  reason  is
he  presence  of  ﬁring  costs,  which  are  paid  by  ﬁrms  but  not
njoyed  by  workers.  The  other  reason  standard  in  this  liter-
ture  is  the  presence  of  labour  hoarding,  represented  by  the
ntegral  expression.  In  particular,  given  the  probability  that
he  idiosyncratic  productivity  x  might  change  in  the  future,
or  a ﬁrm  is  optimal  to  continue  some  negative  match  and
ait  for  a  higher  price,  in  order  to  avoid  the  hiring  cost.  As
ntuitive,  labour  hoarding  is  increasing  in  the  probability  of
 change  .
On  the  other  hand,  the  choice  of  creating  a  job  is  taken
utside  the  match;  therefore  we  use  the  outside  wage  equa-
ion  and  evaluate  the  value  of  a  ﬁlled  job  at  the  upper
upport  of  the  price  distribution.  Substituting  (7)  in  (2),
ubtracting  (10)  and  using  J(R)  =  −pF,  we  get
(r  +  )[J(x¯)  −  J(R)]  =  (1  −  ˇ)p(x¯ −  R)  +  pˇF(r  +  )
J(x¯)  = (1  −  ˇ)p(x¯ −  R)
r  +   −  (1  −  ˇ)pF
(13)
Finally,  inserting  the  zero-proﬁt  condition  (3)  in  (13),  we
et  an  implicit  expression  for    as  a function  of  the  reserva-
ion  productivity  R  and  the  parameters  of  the  model
c
q()
=  (1  −  ˇ)
(
x¯ −  R
r +   −  F
)
(14)
q.  (14)  is  the  second  equilibrium  condition  and  we  will  refer
o  this  as  the  job  creation  condition  (JC).  The  left  hand  side
f  (14)  is  the  cost  of  a vacancy  for  the  expected  duration
f  ﬁlling  a  vacancy.  The  right  hand  side  is  the  discounted
dditional  surplus  a  ﬁrm  gets  from  a  new  job.  Therefore,
his  condition  says  that  in  equilibrium  the  expected  hiring
ost  of  a new  vacancy  has  to  be  equal  to  the  expected  gain
rom  a  new  job.
Eqs.  (12)  and  (14)  jointly  determine  R  and  ,  as  illustrated
n  Fig.  1.  Let  us  deﬁne  (12)  as  B(R,  ,  p,  ω)  =  0  and  (14)  as
(,  R,  ω)  =  0,  where  ω  is  the  set  of  parameters.  Then,  we
ave
∂R
∂
=  − ∂B/∂
∂B/∂R
= cˇ /(1 −  ˇ)
(r  +  G(R))/(r  +  ) > 0  (15)
∂
∂R
=  −∂D/∂R
∂D/∂
= (1  −  ˇ)/(r  +  )
(c/q()2)q′()
<  0  (16)s  (15)  shows,  the  curve  JD  slopes  up  because  a  higher  
ncreases  the  probability  of  ﬁnding  a  job  and,  thus,  the
pportunity  cost  for  a  worker  ((ˇ/(1  −  ˇ))c),  who  now  pre-
ends  a  higher  wage  to  accept  a  job  and,  consequently,  more
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4 At ﬁrst sight, the S.O.C. for this maximization problem would
depend on the value of parameters
∂2rW(x¯)
∂p2
= − + G(R)
r + G(R)
(
z
p2
+ y
2
)Figure  1  Steady-state  reservation  productivity  and  market
tightness.
jobs  are  marginally  destroyed.  On  the  other  hand,  from  (16)
we  know  that  the  curve  JC  slopes  down  because  a  higher
R  increases  the  probability  that  a  job  is  destroyed  G(R)
and,  in  turn,  reduces  the  expected  gain  from  a  new  job
((1  −  ˇ)((x¯--R)/(r  +  ))),  so  less  vacancies  are  opened.
So  far,  the  joint  determination  of  R  and    (for  a  given
level  of  labour  productivity  p)  has  followed  the  previous
literature  and,  indeed,  besides  the  different  speciﬁcation  of
the  worker  utility  function,  no  signiﬁcant  novelty  have  been
introduced.  However,  in  our  model  labour  productivity  is
not  a  parameter,  but  an  ulterior  endogenous  to  be  studied.
Following  our  interpretation  of  p  as  behavioural  component
of  productivity,  we  assumed  that  it  is  determined  by  the
level  of  effort  e  exerted  by  the  employed  worker  and,  in
particular,  that  p  =  e.
The  choice  of  effort  is  rationally  taken  by  workers  when
they  match  with  a  vacant  job,  therefore  in  equilibrium  e
maximizes  the  value  of  being  employed  at  the  upper  sup-
port  of  the  price  distribution  W(x¯).  In  particular,  when  a
worker  takes  this  choice  he  actually  knows  the  job  destruc-
tion  rule  R  and,  thus,  takes  into  account  the  impact  on  it.
Moreover,  given  the  choice  of  effort  is  taken  individually,
the  single  worker  considers  the  impact  on  market  tightness
  marginally  negligible.  From  this,  it  can  be  easily  seen  that
the  same  effort  level  maximizes  the  asset  value  of  unem-
ployment,  being  U  a  monotonically  increasing  function  of
W(x¯)
(r  +  q())U  =  z  +  q()W(x¯)
The  maximization  of  W(x¯)  in  the  form  of  Bellman  equa-
tion  (5)  is  not  a  trivial  calculus.  However,  using  p  =  e  and  the
reservation  property  W(R)  =  U,  Eqs.  (4)  and  (5)  can  be  solved
for  the  permanent  income  form  as  a  function  of  R,  ,  p  and
the  parameters  of  the  model  (see  Appendix  A)
rW(x¯)  =  (1  −  ˇ)z  +  pˇ
(
x¯ +  c  − 1
2
p
)
+ pˇ
r +  
[
G(R(p))RR(p)  +
∫ x¯
R(p)
sdGR(s) − x¯
]
(17)
H
o
tigure  2  Steady-state  reservation  productivity  and  labour
roductivity.
Intuitively,  since  there  is  a non-zero  probability  of  a  pro-
uctivity  shock  and,  all  the  more  so,  of  being  ﬁred,  the
ermanent  income  of  an  employed  worker  at  the  upper  sup-
ort  of  the  price  distribution  is  less  than  his  instantaneous
tility.  The  permanent  income  form  (17)  allows  us  to  take
he  F.O.C.  and  characterize  the  equilibrium  condition  for
abour  productivity  p  ∂rW(x¯)/∂p =  0
 + c--p + 
r + 
[
(G(R)R − x¯) + pG(R) ∂R
∂p
+
∫ x¯
R
sdG(s)
]
= 0
(18)
Eq.  (18)  represents  the  equilibrium  condition  for  labour
roductivity  p  (or  effort  e)4 and  from  now  on  will  be  called
he  productivity  equation  (PE).  From  (18), we  can  notice
hat  the  optimal  level  of  p  depends  on  R and  .  Differently,
rom  (12)  and  (14)  we  can  see  that  only  RE  depends  on  p.
herefore,  for  any  level  of  market  tightness  ,  PE  and  RE
ointly  determine  R  and  p,  as  illustrated  in  Fig.  2.  The  shape
f  these  curves  is  a  bit  more  complicated  than  JC  and  JD,  but
till  intuitive.  Remembering  that  we  deﬁned  the  PE  (12)  as
(R,  ,  p,  ω)  =  0  and,  now,  deﬁning  Eq.  (18)  as  M(p,  R,  ,  ω)  =
,  we  have  the  following ⎧⎪⎨> 0, ∀p >√2z/owever, for a very large set of values, indeed all the plausible
nes, numerical computations unequivocally show that the condi-
ion ∂2rW(x¯)/∂p2 < 0 is respected.
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∂p
∂R
= − ∂M/∂R
∂M/∂p
=
− /(r + ) [G(R) + pf(R)(∂R/∂p)(1--(G(R)/(r + G(R))))]− + (G(R)/(r + G(R)))((z/p2) + (/2)) > 0
(20)
Looking  at  (19),  labour  productivity  p  has  two  opposite
ffects  on  optimal  reservation  productivity  R,  the  disutility-
age  effect  and  the  production  effect. On  one  hand,
 higher  p  increases  the  disutility  of  worker  and  conse-
uently  the  wage  (−(1/2)p),  thus  more  jobs  are  marginally
estroyed.  On  the  other  hand,  a  higher  p  increases  the
alue  of  production  (pR)  and  partially  compensates  a lower
,  leading  to  a  fall  in  R.  Nonetheless,  because  of  the
ncreasing  marginal  disutility  of  effort,  we  can  establish
hat  when  p  is  low  the  effect  on  wage  is  relatively  small
nd  the  effect  on  production  dominates;  on  the  other  hand,
hen  p  is  high  the  disutility  increases  more  than  propor-
ionally  and  the  effect  on  wage  dominates.  Therefore,  RE
as  a  standard  u-shape,  with  a  minimum  in  the  point  in
hich  disutility-wage  effect  and  production  effect  exactly
ompensate.
Similarly,  reservation  productivity  R  affects  labour  pro-
uctivity  p  for  the  continuation  value  effect. In  fact,
 marginal  increase  in  R  does  not  change  the  instan-
aneous  utility  of  worker,  but  certainly  it  does  change
is  continuation  value.  In  particular,  a  higher  R  not  only
ncreases  the  probability  of  being  ﬁred  (G(R)),  shorten-
ng  the  expected  period  of  employment,  but  also  decreases
he  probability  of  ﬁnding  a  job  (q()),  increasing  the
xpected  period  of  unemployment.  Indeed,  both  these
mpacts  affect  negatively  the  continuation  value  and,
herefore,  the  worker  chooses  p  also  in  order  to  address
ptimally  the  level  of  R  through  (12).  This  continuation
alue  effect  is  included  in  the  numerator  of  (20)  and  it  is
reater  for  R  and  p  high,  implying  the  PE  shape  showed  in
ig.  2.
The  last  equation  of  the  model  is  the  steady-state  condi-
ion  for  unemployment,  the  so-called  Beveridge  Curve.
ndeed,  there  are  different  ways  to  derive  this  condi-
ion,  here  we  state  it  in  terms  of  ﬂows  in  and  ﬂows
ut  unemployment.  In  equilibrium  the  number  of  workers
ho  enter  unemployment  (1  −  u)G(R)  has  to  be  equal  to
he  number  of  workers  who  leave  unemployment  uq().
herefore,  the  steady-state  condition  for  unemployment
s
 = G(R)
G (R) +  q() (21)
q.  (21)  is  the  ﬁnal  equilibrium  condition  of  the  model  and
mplies  that  in  equilibrium,  for  any  values  of  R  and  ,  there  is
 unique  unemployment  rate  u  and,  in  turn,  a  unique  number
f  vacant  jobs  v.
The  Beveridge  Curve  is  often  drawn  in  vacancy-
nemployment  space  by  a  downward  sloping  and  convex
urve.  Indeed,  as  highlighted  by  Mortensen  and  Pissarides
1994),  in  the  matching  model  with  endogenous  job  destruc-
ion  the  precise  shape  of  the  Beveridge  Curve  is  ambiguous.
n  particular,  differentiation  of  (21)  shows  that  there  are  two

t
w
wu
Figure  3  Steady-state  unemployment  and  vacancies.
pposite  effects
∂v
∂u
=  −∂T/∂u
∂T/∂v
=
− −G(R)  +  (1  −  u)f(R)((∂R/∂)(∂/∂u))  +  q()
(1  −  u)f(R)((∂R/∂)(∂/∂u))  −  q()(1  +  ) =
− <  0
0
(22)
n  one  hand,  more  vacancies  increase  the  number  of  job
atches,  implying  a  lower  unemployment  rate,  captured  by
he  second  term  of  the  denominator  (22). On  the  other  hand,
ore  vacancies  increase  the  number  of  jobs  destroyed,
mplying  a  higher  unemployment  rate,  the  ﬁrst  term  of  the
enominator  (22).  Despite  this  ambiguity,  since  the  empiri-
al  evidence  seems  to  support  the  conventional  shape,  it  is
ommon  to  assume  that  the  matching  effect  is  stronger  than
he  destruction  one  and,  thus,  to  draw  the  Beveridge  Curve
s  a downward  sloping  and  convex  curve.  In  this  regard,  the
umerical  simulation  of  our  model  with  the  equilibrium  val-
es  also  conﬁrms  this  conventional  form.  Therefore,  in  Fig.  3
e  draw  Eq.  (21)  as  a  downward  sloping  and  convex  curve.
s  usual,  we  draw  the  Beveridge  Curve  with  a  straight  line
hrough  the  origin,  representing  all  the  possible  values  for  v
nd  u  compatible  with  the  equilibrium  market  tightness  .
In  conclusion,  we  are  ready  to  deﬁne  the  rational  expec-
ations  equilibrium  of  the  model:
Steady-state  equilibrium  --  The  rational  expectations
equilibrium  is  a  quadruple  (R*,  *,  p*,  u*)  that  satisﬁes  the
job  destruction  condition  (12), the  job  creation  condition
(14), the  productivity  equation  (18)  and  the  Beveridge
Curve  (21)  implied  by  the  rational  expectations  behaviour
of  individual  ﬁrms  and  workers  and  by  the  matching  tech-
nology.
For  any  value  of  labour  productivity  p,  Eqs.  (12)  and  (14)
etermine  reservation  productivity  R  and  market  tightness
.  Then,  from  all  these  equilibrium  triples,  Eq.  (18)  identiﬁes
he  unique  value  of  equilibrium  productivity  p,  compatible
ith  job  creation  and  job  destruction  conditions.  Finally,
ith  the  knowledge  of  R  and  ,  the  Beveridge  Curve  (21)
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identiﬁes  a  unique  value  of  equilibrium  unemployment  u
and,  in  turn,  a  unique  value  of  v.
Even  if  we  do  not  address  rigorously  the  analysis  of  the
dynamic  out-of-steady-state,  here  we  report  some  proper
remarks.  The  usual  assumptions  in  this  kind  of  analysis  are
that  ﬁrms  are  able  to  open  up  or  close  vacancies  instanta-
neously  and  that  wage  can  be  renegotiated  at  any  time;  that
is,  vacancies  and  wages  are  jump  variables.  These  assump-
tions  ensure  that  the  zero-proﬁt  condition  for  a  new  vacancy
(3)  and  the  sharing  rule  (8)  hold  out  of  equilibrium  as  well.
Similarly,  the  natural  assumptions  to  make  for  the  other
two  unknowns  of  the  model  are  that  ﬁrms  can  shut  down
unproﬁtable  jobs  instantaneously  and  that  workers  exert  the
optimal  effort  at  any  time;  that  is,  reservation  productiv-
ity  and  labour  productivity  are  also  jump  variables.  These
assumptions  imply  that  the  reservation  property  (12)  and
the  optimal  productivity  (18)  hold  both  in  and  out  of  steady-
state.  Differently,  the  dynamic  behaviour  of  unemployment,
governed  by  the  job  ﬂows  in  and  out  of  unemployment,
is  anyhow  constrained  by  the  matching  technology,  which
does  not  allow  jumps  in  job  creation.  Therefore,  unemploy-
ment  is  the  unique  sticky  variable  of  the  model,  because  of
the  friction  in  the  job  creation  process  due  to  the  matching
technology.
Finally,  from  (12),  (14)  and  (18)  it  can  be  easily  seen
that  neither  the  job  destruction  condition,  nor  the  job  cre-
ation  condition,  nor  the  productivity  equation,  depend  on
sticky  variables.  Therefore,  all  these  endogenous  (R,  ,  p)
do  not  exhibit  transitional  dynamics  and,  indeed,  they  must
be  on  their  steady  state  values  even  during  the  adjustments,
all  the  dynamics  being  discharged  on  vacancies  and  unem-
ployment.  Moreover,  notice  that  market  tightness  is  still
a  jump  variable  even  if  unemployment  is  sticky,  because
ﬁrms  can  adjust  instantaneously  the  optimal  vacancies  dur-
ing  the  transitional  dynamics  of  unemployment.  Therefore,
following  this  argument  it  is  natural  to  imagine  the  out-of-
steady-state  dynamics  as  a  saddle  path,  with  one  stable  root
for  unemployment  and  three  unstable  roots  for  the  other
endogenous5.
4. Qualitative analysis
In  this  section  we  address  the  main  question  of  the  impact  of
EPL  on  steady-state  and,  in  particular,  on  endogenous  labour
productivity.  However,  in  order  to  highlight  the  relevance
of  the  extension  pursued  in  this  paper,  pre-emptively  we
start  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  F  considering  p  a  param-
eter  and  only  subsequently  we  regard  p  as  the  endogenous
productivity.
Indeed,  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  EPL  on  job  creation
and  job  destruction,  considering  p  a  parameter,  retraces
basically  the  previous  matching  literature.  From  (12)  and
(14)  we  have  that∂R
∂F
=  −∂B/∂F
∂B/∂R
=  − r
(r  +  G(R))/(r  +  ) <  0 (23)
5 A much more rigorous analysis of the transitional dynamics in
this kind of models has been pursued in Pissarides (1985 or 1990)
and can be found also in Pissarides (1990). However, here we follow
the same line and arguments of Pissarides (2000).
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digure  4  Impact  of  ﬁring  costs  on  reservation  productivity
nd market  tightness  (with  p  ﬁxed).
∂
∂F
=  −∂D/∂F
∂D/∂
=  − 1 −  ˇ
(c/q()2)q′()
<  0  (24)
As  (23)  and  (24)  show,  ﬁring  costs  reduce  both  R  and  .
he  impact  on  R  is  due  to  the  fact  that  destroying  a  job
s  more  costly,  whereas  the  impact  on    is  because,  once  a
ob  is  created,  ﬁrms  will  pay  sooner  or  later  the  ﬁring  costs
nd  this  reduces  the  expected  proﬁt  from  a  new  job.  To
et  the  equilibrium  impact  we  need  to  consider  the  overall
mpact  of  F,  so  we  differentiate  (12)  and  (14),  respectively
s  B(R∗,  (R∗,  F),  p,  F,  ω)  =  0  and  D(∗,  R(∗, F),  F,  ω)  =  0  and
e  get
∂R∗
∂F
= − ∂B/∂F
∂B/∂R∗
=
− (ˇq()
2/q′())  +  r
[(r  +  G(R∗))/(r  +  )]  −  [ˇq()2/((r  +  )q′())] <  0(s)
(25)
∂∗
∂F
= − ∂D/∂F
∂D/∂∗
=  − (1  −  ˇ)((r/(r  +  G(R)))  −  1)
(c/q(∗)2)q′(∗) −  (cˇ /(r  +  G(R))) <  0
(26)
herefore,  in  equilibrium  ﬁring  costs  reduce  both  job
estruction  and  job  creation.  In  particular,  we  can  see
hat  the  equilibrium  impact  on  job  destruction  (25)  is  even
tronger  than  the  initial  impact  (23),  because  higher  ﬁr-
ng  costs  reduce  market  tightness  and  in  turn  wage,  thus
ess  jobs  are  destroyed  marginally  (see  (15)  and  (24)).  On
he  other  hand,  the  equilibrium  impact  on  job  creation  (26)
s  weaker  than  the  initial  impact  (24),  because  ﬁring  costs
ncrease  the  duration  of  jobs  and  this  partially  attenuates
he  loss  of  the  expected  proﬁt  due  to  F  (see  (16)  and  (23)).
he  equilibrium  impact  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  4,  where  higher
 shifts  JD  down  and  JC  left.  As  the  ﬁgure  shows,  job  destruc-
ion  decreases  unambiguously  whereas  the  effect  on  job
reation  would  seem  ambiguous,  but  indeed  we  know  from
26)  that  job  creation  decreases  as  well.
Because  of  the  symmetric  impact  on  job  creation  and  job
estruction,  the  impact  of  ﬁring  costs  on  unemployment  in
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Considering  p  the  endogenous  component  of
productivity  leads  us  to  reassess  the  equilibrium
impact  of  F  on  job  creation  and  job  destruction.
In  particular,  now  we  differentiate  (12)  and  (14),
respectively  as  B(R∗,  (R∗,  F),  p(R∗,  ),  F,  ω)  =  0  andies.
atching  models  is  usually  ambiguous,  as  differentiation  of
21)  shows
∂u
∂F
= f(R)q()(∂R/∂F)  −  G(R)q()(∂/∂F)
[G(R)  +  q()]2 =  0
The  equilibrium  impact  on  unemployment  is  illustrated
n  Fig.  5.  Higher  ﬁring  costs  shift  the  Beveridge  Curve  in  and
otate  the  job  creation  line  clockwise,  therefore  the  impact
n  unemployment  is  ambiguous,  but  vacancies  decrease
nambiguously.
So  far,  we  considered  p  a  parameter  unaffected  by  ﬁr-
ng  costs  and,  basically,  we  obtained  the  same  results  of
he  previous  literature  without  signiﬁcant  novelty.  Nonethe-
ess,  in  our  model  p  is  the  endogenous  component  of  labour
roductivity,  thus  now  we  regard  it  as  endogenous  and,
n  particular,  we  allow  it  to  be  affected  by  a  change  in
.  Intuitively,  we  expect  that  ﬁring  costs  affect  in  some
ay  the  behavioural  component  of  productivity  for  differ-
nt  reasons.  Firstly,  as  (7)  and  (8)  show  ﬁring  costs  affect
irectly  the  actual  and  future  wage.  Moreover,  they  affect
ndirectly  wage  through  the  probability  of  ﬁnding  a  job
q()).  Finally,  they  inﬂuence  the  probability  of  being  ﬁred
G(R)),  affecting  the  continuation  value  of  (17).
From  (18)  we  have  that  the  initial  impact  of  ﬁring  costs
n  optimal  productivity  is  null,  that  is
∂p
∂F
= − ∂M/∂F
∂M/∂p
=  − 0− + (G(R)/(r + G(R)))((z/p2) + (/2)) = 0The  economic  intuition  of  this  result  is  that  ﬁring  costs
ave  a  negative  effect  on  the  outside  wage  and  a  positive
ffect  on  the  inside  wage,  thus  in  expectations  these  two
mpacts  on  the  permanent  income  of  a  new  worker  compen-
ate,  as  showed  by  (17).  This  interpretation  is  made  evident
y  the  difference  between  (17)  and  the  permanent  income
f  a  worker  inside  a  match
D
o
t
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W(x)  =  (1  −  ˇ)z  +  pˇ(x  +  c  +  rF  −  (1/2)p) +  pˇ
r  +  
×
[
G(R(p))R(p)  +
∫ x¯
R(p)
sdG(s) −  x
]
here  ﬁring  costs  certainly  have  a  positive  effect  on  wage.
herefore,  all  the  effect  of  F  on  p  should  be  induced  by  the
mpact  on  the  other  endogenous  affecting  the  worker  con-
inuation  value.  In  fact,  as  long  as  R  and    do  not  vary  there
s  no  change  on  the  continuation  value  and  the  permanent
ncome  of  a new  worker,  thus  there  should  be  no  impact
n  labour  productivity.  To  get  the  equilibrium  impact  we
ifferentiate  (18)  as  M(p∗,  R(,  p∗,  F),  (R,  F),  ω)  =  0  and  we
et  the  following:
∂p∗
∂F
= − ∂M/∂F
∂M/∂p∗
= − (∂M/∂R)(∂R/∂F)  + (∂M/∂)(∂/∂F)
(∂M/∂p∗) + ((∂M/∂R)(∂R/∂p∗)) =  −
< 0
< 0
(27)
roposition  1.  A  higher  level  of  EPL  reduces  the  equilib-
ium  labour  productivity  through  the  impact  on  reservation
roductivity  and  market  tightness.6
The  economic  intuition  of  this  result  lies  in  the  following
rgument.  As  (12)  shows,  labour  productivity  has  a  negative
mpact  on  reservation  productivity  through  the  production
ffect,  therefore  in  the  choice  of  the  optimal  p  the  produc-
ion  effect  induces  workers  to  choose  marginally  a  higher
 to  reduce  R  and,  in  turn,  the  probability  of  being  ﬁred
G(R)).  Indeed,  when  we  analyze  the  impact  of  ﬁring  costs
n  reservation  productivity  we  can  easily  realize  that  the
ffect  is  of  the  same  magnitude  of  the  production  effect.
o  see  this  point  let  multiply  (12)  by  p  and  concentrate  on
he  production  effect  and  the  ﬁring  costs  effect, ignoring
or  a  while  the  other  elements
R  +  rpF  =  0  (28)
As  (28)  shows,  the  production  effect  is  partially  substi-
uted  by  the  ﬁring  costs  effect  in  lowering  R  and  thus  a
igher  F,  amplifying  the  relevance  of  the  disutility  effect,
nduces  workers  to  choose  marginally  a  lower  p.  Moreover,
 higher  F reduces  also    and  consequently  both  outside  and
nside  wage,  again  inducing  workers  to  choose  a  lower  p  (see
24)).  The  equilibrium  impact  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  6,  when
 higher  F  shifts  RE  down  and  PE  left.(∗,  R(∗,  F,  p(R,  ∗)),  F,  ω)  =  0  and  we  get
6 At ﬁrst sight, there might be an ambiguity on the denominator
f (27). However, both graphical analysis and numerical computa-
ions with a large set of values, indeed the most plausible ones,
nequivocally show that (27) is negative.
The  impact  of  EPL  on  labour  productivity  137
PE
RE
R
R∗
R∗∗
p∗∗ p∗ p
JD
JC
R
R∗
θ∗∗
R∗∗
R∗∗∗
θ ∗∗∗ θ∗ θ
F
a
e
t
b
o
t
a
5
I
t
o
a
t
r
t
1
m
F
n
i.e.  G(x)  =  (x  −  x-)/(x¯ −  x-) =  x.  Following  the  previous  lit-
erature,  the  baseline  parameters  reported  in  Table  1  are
set  so  as  to  match  some  typical  features  of  the  empirical
7 Usually, in the literature the idiosyncratic component of pro-
ductivity x is an additive component of total price (p + x) and the
distribution is taken uniform over [x-, x¯], with x- being a negative
number. However, the exogenous level of labour productivity p is
ﬁxed so that the total price is fairly everywhere positive (see e.g.
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, 1999a,b). Differently, in our model
we make a preference for the interpretation of the idiosyncratic
component as a multiplicative component of total price (px), thusFigure  6  Impact  of  ﬁring  costs  on  reservation  productivity
and labour  productivity.
∂R∗
∂F
= − ∂B/∂F
∂B/∂R∗
=
− (∂B/∂)(∂/∂F)  +  (∂B/∂F)
(∂B/∂R∗)  +  ((∂B/∂)(∂/∂R∗))  +  ((∂B/∂p)(∂p/∂R∗)) < 0
(29)
∂∗
∂F
= − ∂D/∂F
∂D/∂∗
=
− ((∂D/∂R)(∂R/∂F))  + (∂D/∂F)
(∂D/∂∗) + ((∂D/∂R)(∂R/∂∗) + ((∂D/∂R)(∂R/∂p)(∂p/∂∗) < 0
(30)
from  which  we  can  easily  establish  the  following  results∣∣(29)∣∣ > ∣∣(25)∣∣ and ∣∣(30)∣∣ < ∣∣(26)∣∣,  summarized  in  the  next
Proposition:
Proposition  2.  Compared  to  the  standard  equilibrium  with
p  as  a  parameter  of  the  model,  in  the  equilibrium
with  endogenous  labour  productivity  EPL  reduces  even  more
job  destruction,  but  reduces  less  job  creation.
The  economic  intuition  of  this  result  is  that,  as  we  have
seen  before  (28),  the  presence  of  a  more  stringent  protec-
tion  legislation  reduces  the  role  of  the  production  effect
and  ampliﬁes  that  of  the  disutility-wage  effect, leading  to
a  lower  labour  productivity  which  decreases  wages  and,  in
turn,  the  optimal  reservation  productivity.  Consequently,
lower  job  destruction  increases  the  expected  duration  of
job  and  partially  attenuates  the  loss  of  the  expected  proﬁt
due  to  higher  ﬁring  costs,  leading  to  a  smaller  reduction
of  job  creation.  The  equilibrium  impact  on  R  and    with
endogenous  labour  productivity  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  7.
In  conclusion,  regarding  p  as  the  endogenous  compo-
nent  of  productivity  changes  quantitatively  the  equilibrium
impact  of  F  on  job  creation  and  job  destruction,  but  not  the
direction.  However,  ﬁrstly  the  extension  of  the  model  with
endogenous  labour  productivity  should  be  important  per  se,
w
1
i
uigure  7  Impact  of  ﬁring  costs  on  reservation  productivity
nd market  tightness  (with  p  endogenous).
specially  in  the  light  of  the  recent  empirical  evidence  on
he  impact  of  EPL  on  labour  productivity.  Moreover,  as  will
e  clear  in  the  next  section,  considering  p  an  endogenous
bject  of  the  model  turns  out  to  be  very  much  important  for
he  quantitative  exercise  and,  in  particular,  for  the  welfare
nalysis  and  consequent  policy  implications  concerning  EPL.
.  Quantitative analysis
n  this  section  we  attempt  a  rough  calibration  of  the  model
o  evaluate  quantitatively  the  impact  of  ﬁring  costs  not  only
n  labour  market  performance,  but  also  on  some  measure  of
ggregate  welfare.  As  standard  in  this  literature,  we  adopt
he  following  Cobb-Douglas  matching  function  with  constant
eturns  to  scale,  usually  the  speciﬁcation  most  appropriate
o  match  the  data  on  job  creation  (see  e.g.  Layard  et  al.,
991, for  the  UK;  Blanchard  and  Diamond,  1989,  for  the  US)
(u,  v)  =  Au˛v1−˛
urthermore,  the  distribution  of  the  idiosyncratic  compo-
ent  of  productivity  is  taken  uniform  over  the  support  [0,1],7e need to adopt a positive support for the distribution (see Lilien,
982; Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; Pissarides, 2000). Nonetheless,
t is clear that both interpretations maintain the same mechanism
nderpinning the reservation productivity.
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Table  1  Baseline  parameters.
A  ˛  ˇ    r  z  c    [x-, x¯]
0.15 0.5 0.5 0.081  0.03  0.35  0.05  0.5  [0,  1]
Table  2  Impact  of  F  on  labour  market  equilibrium.
U  JF  P  R    ud
F  =  0  0.212  5.5  2.29  0.87  3.03  3.83
F =  1 0.205  4.9  2.09  0.77  2.57  4.15
F =  2 0.197 4.3 1.92 0.67 2.15 4.55
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Table  3  Job  creation  and  Job  destruction  with  p  ﬁxed
(p =  2.29).
R  (p  =  2.29)    (p  =  2.29)  R  
F  =  0  0.87  3.03  0.87  3.03
F =  1  0.78  2.08  0.77  2.57
F =  2  0.69  1.26  0.67  2.15
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oF  =  3 0.188 3.7 1.76 0.56 1.75 5.03
F  =  4 0.176 3.1 1.62 0.47 1.39 5.65
ata  (e.g.  Davis  and  Haltiwanger,  1992).  To  this  extent,
he  parameters  of  the  matching  function  are  set  as  usual
t  A  =  0.15  and  ˛  =  0.5.  The  workers’  bargaining  power  is
et  at  ˇ  =  0.5  equal  to  the  elasticity  of  the  matching  func-
ion,  so  as  to  get  constrained  efﬁciency  at  least  in  the
conomy  without  ﬁring  costs  (e.g.  Hosios,  1990).  To  gener-
te  in  the  simulation  reasonable  job  ﬂows,  the  arrival  rate
f  the  idiosyncratic  productivity  shock  is  set    =  0.081  (see
ortensen  and  Pissarides,  1994).  Similarly,  the  worker  pref-
rence  parameter  governing  the  disutility  of  effort  is  set  at
 =  0.5,  which  induces  an  increasing  disutility  of  effort  but
ndeed  generates  reasonable  values  of  labour  productivity.
inally,  in  our  simulation  we  consider  a  semester  as  the  unit
f  time  and,  accordingly,  we  set  the  interest  rate  at  r  =  0.03
see  e.g.  Cahuc  and  Postel-Vinay,  2002).
In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  ﬁring  costs  on  labour
arket  performance,  we  compute8 different  equilibriums
f  the  model  with  F  varying  from  0  to  4.  This  should  cover  a
igniﬁcant  range,  from  the  laissez--faire  case  (F  =  0)  to  the
ubstantial  ﬁring  restrictions  case  (F  =  4),  where  ﬁring  costs
re  more  than  three  times  the  semester  wage  (see  e.g.  for
taly  Garibaldi,  2006).  In  Table  2  we  report  the  equilibrium
alues  of  unemployment  rate,  job  ﬂows,  labour  productivity,
eservation  productivity,  market  tightness  and  unemploy-
ent  spell  duration  for  different  levels  of  ﬁring  restrictions.
First,  we  can  see  that  more  stringent  ﬁring  restrictions
educe  signiﬁcantly  the  equilibrium  labour  productivity.  In
articular,  a  level  of  ﬁring  costs  equal  to  two  times  the
emester  wage  (F  =  2)  is  enough  to  reduce  labour  produc-
ivity  more  than  10%  respect  to  the  laissez--faire  case,
hereas  in  the  substantial  ﬁring  restrictions  case  the  reduc-
ion  is  even  of  the  30%.  Similarly,  ﬁring  costs  reduce  both
eservation  productivity  and  market  tightness  and,  in  turn,
ob  ﬂows.  As  we  can  see,  job  ﬂows  in  the  substantial  ﬁr-
ng  restrictions  case  are  less  than  60%  of  those  in  the
aissez--faire  case.  Nonetheless,  as  standard  in  these  models
e.g.  Mortensen  and  Pissarides,  1999a),  the  overall  impact
n  unemployment  is  positive,  because  the  impact  on  job
estruction  overcomes  that  on  job  creation.  Interestingly,
he  difference  in  the  level  of  job  ﬂows  between  the  econ-
my  with  low  ﬁring  costs  (5.5  −  4.9)  and  that  with  high  ﬁring
osts  (3.7  −  3.1),  seems  to  match  reasonably  the  real  data
8 Fix point algorithm written in Matlab available under request by
he author.
E
mF =  3  0.61  0.59  0.56  1.75
F =  4  0.53  0.11  0.47  1.39
n  the  U.S.,  the  quintessential  frictionless  country,  and  the
uropean  countries,  where  notoriously  ﬁring  restrictions  are
onsistent.  Finally,  because  of  the  decrease  on  job  creation,
igher  ﬁring  costs  increase  signiﬁcantly  the  unemployment
pell  duration.  In  particular,  in  the  substantial  ﬁring  restric-
ions  case  the  unemployment  duration  increases  more  than
0%  respect  to  the  laissez--faire  case.
In  Table  3  we  show  the  equilibrium  values  of  reserva-
ion  productivity  and  market  tightness  in  the  model  with  p
xogenous,  along  with  their  values  for  the  complete  speciﬁ-
ation.  In  particular,  we  set  the  exogenous  productivity  p  at
he  equilibrium  level  get  in  the  laissez--faire  case  (p  =  2.29)
nd  we  keep  p  ﬁxed,  regardless  of  the  value  of  F.  In  this  way
e  make  clear  what  happen  to  job  creation  and  job  destruc-
ion  when  we  allow  labour  productivity  to  adjust  optimally
o  change  in  ﬁring  costs.  As  we  can  see,  this  numerical  exer-
ise  conﬁrms  exactly  the  result  of  the  qualitative  analysis
see  (29), (30)  and  Fig.  7).  In  particular,  when  we  allow  p
o  respond  optimally  to  change  in  F,  this  leads  to  an  even
tronger  reduction  of  the  equilibrium  reservation  produc-
ivity,  but  to  a  smaller  reduction  of  the  equilibrium  market
ightness.
Finally,  to  assess  the  impact  of  ﬁring  costs  on  the  well-
eing  of  the  economy,  we  compute  the  value  of  different
easures  of  aggregate  welfare  from  the  laissez--faire  to
he  substantial  ﬁring  restrictions  case.  In particular,  we
onsider  two  main  measures  of  aggregate  welfare,  the  ﬁrst
oncerning  the  production  net  of  recruiting  costs  (Y  −  RC),
he  second  the  utility  of  agents  (AWF). Our  consistent  meas-
res  of  aggregate  welfare  in  the  economy  are  (see  Appendix
)
 =  uq()px¯[1  +  (1  −  )(1  −  u  −  uq())] +
(1  −  u  −  uq())pE(x|x≥R)[  +  (1  −  )(1  −  uq())]  (31)
WF  =  uq()rW(x¯)[1  +  (1  −  )(1  −  u  −  uq())] +
(1  −  u  −  uq())rW(E(x|x≥R))[  +  (1  −  )  ×
(1  −  uq ())]  +  urU (32)
here  E(x|x≥R)  indicates  the  conditional  expectation  of  the
diosyncratic  productivity  x  over  the  truncated  distribution
f  the  active  units  [R, x¯],  that  is
(x|x≥R)  =
∫
x¯
R
xg(x)dxG(x¯)  −  G(R)
In  Table  4  we  report  the  equilibrium  values  of  these  two
easures  of  aggregate  welfare  for  different  levels  of  ﬁring
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Table  4  Impact  of  F  on  aggregate  welfare.
Y  Y  −  RC  rW(x¯) rW(E(x))  rU  AWF
F  =  0 1.70 1.62  0.73  0.71  0.69  0.71
F =  1  1.49  1.43  0.66  0.65  0.61  0.64
F =  2  1.30  1.26  0.58  0.59  0.55  0.58
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dF =  3  1.14  1.11  0.52  0.55  0.50  0.54
F =  4  1.01  0.98  0.48  0.52  0.46  0.50
restrictions.  Along  with  these  main  measures  of  welfare,  we
report  some  other  index  of  well-being  in  the  economy,  as  the
permanent  income  of  unemployed  and  employed  worker  in
different  conditions.
As  standard  in  the  matching  literature,  ﬁring  restrictions
reduce  unambiguously  all  measures  of  aggregate  welfare,
regardless  we  think  the  well-being  of  the  economy  in  terms
of  production  or  utility  of  agents.9 This  is  not  surpris-
ing,  since  we  know  that  under  the  restriction  ˛  =  ˇ  the
laissez--faire  economy  gets  the  constrained  efﬁciency.  More
interesting  is  the  size  of  the  reduction  of  production.  In  par-
ticular,  a  middle  level  of  ﬁring  restrictions  is  sufﬁcient  to
yield  a  production  25%  lower  respect  to  the  laissez--faire
case,  whereas  in  the  substantial  ﬁring  restrictions  case  the
production  is  even  40%  lower.  Indeed,  despite  the  negative
impact  of  EPL  on  aggregate  welfare  being  well  known  (see
e.g.  Cahuc  and  Postel-Vinay,  2002),  such  worrying  reduction
in  production  is  not  standard:
Proposition  3.  Compared  to  the  standard  matching  model
with  p  exogenous,  in  the  equilibrium  with  endogenous
labour  productivity  EPL  reduces  even  more  the  aggregate
welfare,  regardless  we  consider  the  well-being  of  the  econ-
omy  in  terms  of  production  or  aggregate  utility.
Nonetheless,  hidden  under  this  result  there  is  exactly  the
negative  impact  of  ﬁring  restrictions  on  labour  productivity,
which  not  only  reduces  the  total  production  of  the  economy,
but  also  the  surplus  from  job  matches  and,  therefore,  the
utility  of  agents.  Unsurprisingly,  the  inclusion  in  the  analy-
sis  of  this  element  enriches  the  picture  of  our  model  and,
certainly,  tells  us  an  alarming  result  we  should  worry  about.
6. Conclusion
The  matching  model  studied  in  this  paper  revealed  that,
indeed,  the  level  of  labour  productivity  in  the  economy  can
be  inﬂuenced  by  labour  market  policies  usually  implemented
by  governments.  Stimulated  by  the  recent  empirical  evi-
dence,  we  focused  on  EPL  and  showed  that  a  higher  level
of  ﬁring  restrictions  partially  substitute  high  labour  produc-
tivity  in  reducing  job  destruction  and  this,  consequently,
9 For what concern the welfare measure in terms of utility we
should remember that we assumed risk neutral and impatient work-
ers, which implies zero saving and full consumption. This is usually
done in this literature in order to avoid to solving the consumption
problem, so that we can work with the maximized Bellman equation
to derive the steady-state of the model. Nonetheless, such limita-
tion should be somewhat taken in mind when we think about the
policy implications of our results.
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rings  down  the  optimal  level  of  productivity.  Further-
ore,  the  response  of  productivity  to  EPL  reasonably  affects
he  level  of  production  and,  in  fact,  numerical  simulation
f  the  model  showed  that  a  higher  level  of  ﬁring  costs
hould  induce  a  consistent  reduction  on  production,  beyond
he  standard  reduction  found  in  the  literature.  Moreover,
espite  the  reduction  on  the  disutility  of  effort,  higher
PL  reduces  unambiguously  our  measures  of  aggregate  wel-
are  (AWF), inducing  a  worsening  on  the  well-being  of  both
mployed  and  unemployed  workers.  Therefore,  in  the  light
f  the  predominant  role  of  labour  productivity  growth  in
riving  the  income  growth  in  the  last  twenty  years  (OECD,
003,  2007),  the  results  of  this  paper  bring  a  further  ele-
ent  in  support  of  the  consolidated  voice  of  the  literature
or  a  reduction  of  EPL  especially  in  European  countries.
To  conclude,  the  extension  of  the  endogenous  labour
roductivity  pursued  in  this  paper  allows  us  to  rationalize
ithin  the  already  fruitful  matching  approach  the  well-
stablished  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  on  EPL  on
abour  productivity,  which  indeed  assumes  the  appearance
f  a  macro-stylized  fact  in  the  European  economies  and,
hus,  should  be  explained  in  a  macro  model  of  the  labour
arket.  On  the  other  hand,  the  inclusion  of  the  optimal
orkers’  response  to  political  tools  should  represent  a  pos-
tive  element  for  any  other  policy  evaluation.  In  particular,
ncluding  both  optimal  agents’  responses  and  market  out-
omes,  the  matching  approach  might  turn  out  to  be  the
deal  framework  to  address  crucial  questions  usually  ana-
yzed  in  microeconomic  contexts,  but  that  certainly  present
igniﬁcant  macro  implications.
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ppendix A.
.1.  Worker  permanent  income  at  the  upper
upport of  the  price  distribution  (17)
here  are  different  ways  in  which  the  permanent  income
quation  (17)  can  be  derived  using  the  equilibrium  condi-
ions;  we  show  one  of  these  which  allow  us  to  establish
ifferent  interesting  relations.
First  from  the  asset  value  of  unemployed  worker  (4)  we
ave  that
 = z
r  +  q() +
q()
r +  q()W(x¯)  (33)
From  the  asset  value  of  employed  worker  (5)  we  have
hat
1 2
∫ x¯r  +  )W(x)  =  w(x)  −
2
p +  
R
W(s)dG(s)  +  G(R)U
(34)
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on  output.
Similarly,  the  aggregate  welfare  function  is  the  weighted
sum  of  utility  of  the  different  workers  in  steady  state,40  
Evaluating  (34)  at  the  upper  support  of  the  price  distri-
ution  and  at  the  reservation  productivity
r  +  )W(x¯)  =  w0 − 12p
2 +  
∫ x¯
R
W(s)dG(s)  +  G(R)U  (35)
r  +  )W(R)  =  w(R)  − 1
2
p2 +  
∫ x¯
R
W(s)dG(s)  +  G(R)U
(36)
Now  subtracting  (36)  from  (35)  and  using  the  reservation
roperty  W(R)  =  U  we  get
r  +  )[W(x¯)  −  W(R)]  =  pˇ(1  −  R)  −  pˇF(r  +  )W(x¯)  −
U  =  pˇ
[
1  −  R
r +   −  F
]
(37)
Substituting  (33)  in  (37)  we  obtain
W(x¯)  =  z  +  (r  +  q()) pˇ
[
1  −  R
r  +   −  F
]
(38)
Similarly,  subtract  (36)  from  (34)  to  get
(x)  −  U  =  pˇ x −  R
r  +  
and  now  substitute  (33)  and  use  (38)  to  obtain
W(x)  =  rW(x¯)  −  rˇ p
[
1  −  x
r  +   −  F
]
(39)
This  expression  interestingly  says  that  when  ﬁring  costs
re  low  the  permanent  income  of  a  generic  worker  is  always
ower  than  that  of  a  new  worker,  the  difference  being  due
o  the  different  level  of  the  idiosyncratic  productivity.  How-
ver,  when  ﬁring  costs  are  high  the  advantage  of  being
lready  inside  a  match,  leading  to  a  higher  wage,  overturns
he  relation  in  favour  of  the  generic  worker  (see  Table  4).
Finally,  inserting  (39)  in  the  integral  expression  of  the
sset  value  of  a  new  worker  we  get
W(x¯)  =  w0 − 12p
2 +  
∫ x¯
R
{
W(x¯)  −  pˇ
[
1  −  s
r  +   −  F
]}
×
dG(s)  +  G(R)U  −  W(x¯)  =  w0 − 12p
2 −
G(R)
[
W(x¯)  −  U]+  pˇ
r +   ×[∫ x¯
R
sdG(s) −  (1  −  G(R))
]
+   pˇF(1 −  G(R))
and  now  using  (37)  and  substituting  the  outside  wage
quation  (7)  gives  us  (17)
W(x¯)  =  (1  −  ˇ)z  +  pˇ
(
x¯ +  c  − 1
2
p
)
+ pˇ
r  +  
[
G(R(p))R(p)  +
∫ x¯
R
sdG(s) − x¯
] k
c
a
wD.  Lisi
Similarly,  inserting  (39)  in  the  asset  value  of  the  generic
orker  gives  his  permanent  income.
.2.  Total  production  (31)  and  aggregate  welfare
unction (32)
n  equilibrium  there  are  (1  −  u)  producing  workers,  who  dif-
er  only  for  the  level  of  the  idiosyncratic  productivity  x.
mong  these  uq()  workers  are  in  the  ﬁrst  period  of  employ-
ent,  therefore  produce  at  the  upper  support  of  the  price
istribution x¯.  Instead,  the  other  (1  −  u  −  uq())  workers
ere  employed  already  the  previous  period  and  indeed  their
evel  of  x  is  not  the  same  for  all  of  them.  In  particular,  a
raction    faced  a  productivity  shock  and  changed  the  level
f  x  in  a  new  value  between x¯ and  R,  whereas  the  com-
lement  (1  −  )  maintained  the  same  level  of  the  previous
eriod.  In  turn,  among  these  old  workers  maintaining  the
evel  of  x,  a fraction  uq()  entered  two  period  ago  and
herefore  produce  at  the  upper  support  of  the  price  dis-
ribution x¯,  whereas  the  others  (1  −  uq())  entered  more
han  two  period  ago  and  indeed  we  should  distinguish  again
etween  those  who  faced  a  productivity  shock  and  those
ho  not  and  so  forth.  Therefore,  the  total  production  is
 =  uq()px¯ +  (1  −  u  −  uq()){pE(x|x≥R)  +
(1  −  )[uq()px¯  +  (1  −  uq()){pE(x|x≥R)  +
(1  −  )[uq()px¯ +  (1  −  uq()). . .]}]}
As  intuitive,  the  precise  computation  of  the  level  of
diosyncratic  productivity  of  producing  workers  in  steady
tate  is  troubling,  due  to  the  recursive  computation.
onetheless,  given  that  our  aim  is  to  evaluate  the  impact  of
ring  restrictions  on  total  production,  it  would  be  harmless
o  make  an  assumption  to  simplify  the  computation  which
ffects  in  the  same  way  the  value  of  production  between
he  laissez--faire  and  the  substantial  ﬁring  restriction  case.
bviously,  more  an  employed  worker  is  old  higher  is  the
robability  that  he  faced  a  productivity  shock  and  changed
is  level  of  x.  For  simplicity,  in  (31)  we  assume  that  all
orkers  older  than  two  periods  faced  a  productivity  shock.
herefore,  our  measure  of  total  production  is
 =  uq()px¯  +  (1  −  u  −  uq()){pE(x|x≥R)  +
(1  −  )[uq()px¯ +  (1  −  uq ())pE(x|x≥R)]}
hich  after  some  easy  algebra  gives  us  (31).
Moreover,  to  check  if  our  assumption  is  really  harmless
or  our  purpose,  we  repeated  a  similar  numerical  exercise
f  Table  4  assuming  that  all  workers  older  than  three  periods
aced  a  productivity  shock.  As  expected,  we  did  not  get
ny  sizable  difference  on  the  impact  of  ﬁring  restrictionsnowing  that  the  utility  of  worker  depends  on  the  idiosyn-
ratic  component  of  productivity.  Following  the  identical
rgument  mentioned  before,  in  equilibrium  the  aggregate
elfare  function  is
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AWF = urU + uq()rW(x¯) + (1 − u − uq()){rW(E(x|x≥R)) +
(1 − )[uq()rW(x¯) + (1 − uq())rW(E(x|x≥R))]}
which  after  some  easy  algebra  gives  us  (32).
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